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Personal autonomy is arguably one of the most sacred protected rights
of an individual under the United States Constitution, which provides, in
part, that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law."' This essential constitutional right has become a
topic of controversy in medicine and various end-of-life decisions. This es-
say will examine topics ranging from the rejection of life-sustaining treat-
ment and medical futility to physician-assisted suicide and abortion. Each
end-of-life subject is unique and divisive; however, analyzing these topics
together and comparing the laws regarding each area may help untangle the
web of confusion over these ever-important medical determinations.
Perhaps it would be most appropriate to begin with a broader perspec-
tive on end-of-life decisions concerning terminal illnesses. Such scenarios
create a host of issues concerning not only medicine, but also society as a
whole, ethics, politics, and the law of the jurisdiction in question. Behind
every situation involving terminal illnesses, there are several complexities
that surface when making two necessary determinations: "(1) who should be
authorized to resolve the problem, and (2) what substantive principles should
apply."2
I. "RIGHT TO DIE"
The phrase "right to die" concerns the basic concept of an individual
having full autonomy over the choice between continuing or discontinuing
life-supporting treatment when faced with a terminal illness. One typical
situation involves the incapacitated patient's family refusing life-sustaining
treatment, opting instead to remove life support after years of hope that the
patient's condition would improve. The seminal case regarding the right-to-
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1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
2. BARRY R. FURROW, THOMAS L. GREANEY, SANDRA H. JOHNSON, TIMOTHY
STOLTZFUS JOST & ROBERT L. SCHWARTZ, HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS
AND PROBLEMS, 1408 (6th ed. 2008).
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die setting is Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health.3 However,
the media coverage surrounding Terry Schiavo from 2001 to her death in
2005 was perhaps one of the most well-known examples in recent history
highlighting this ethical dilemma.4 Both of these cases involved a family's
willingness to remove life-sustaining treatment from a dying patient, and
both will be discussed at length in this essay.
A. Medical Futility
The converse concept, the "reverse right to die," is the less-publicized
notion of medical futility pertaining to the rare circumstance in which physi-
cians have provided their expert opinions that further treatment is medically
futile, yet the family desires to continue the treatment. It goes without saying
that the decision-making process becomes complicated. Medical futility in-
volves novel and complex issues, and some refer to the concept as "reverse
right to die," which is a play on the aforementioned notion of the "right to
die." Medical futility is a highly controversial topic dealing with the limits
on personal autonomy at the end of an individual's life. One suggested defi-
nition of the term is "interventions that are unlikely to produce any signifi-
cant benefit for the patient."5 A more authoritative and detailed
characterization describes medical futility as the conflict that arises "[w]hen
the medical professional and the patient, through a surrogate, disagree on the
worth of pursuing life" where the former considers medical intervention to be
futile and the latter desires to delay the inevitable.6
B. Physician-Assisted Deaths
Physician-assisted death is generally the most controversial end-of-life
issue, as society has by and large admonished such undertakings in the field
of medicine. This essay will examine this topic through two of the highest
court's decisions in the cases of Washington v. Glucksberg7 and Vacco v.
Quill.8 Of course, the most infamous poster child for this subject is Dr. Jack
Kevorkian, who pushed the limits of the law by helping patients accelerate
their own deaths and was incarcerated for his actions. This essay will ex-
amine the Supreme Court's rulings on an individual's constitutional right in
this controversial situation, which is often known as "physician-assisted sui-
3. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
4. See generally Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1289 (11 th Cir.
2005).
5. Nancy S. Jecker, Ethics in Medicine, UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON (Apr. 11,
2008), http://depts.washington.edu/bioethx/topics/futil.html.
6. Causey v. St. Francis Med. Ctr., 719 So.2d 1072, 1074-75 (La. App. 2d Cir.,
1998).
7. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
8. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
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cide" or euthanasia. The law has proven to be quite firm and consistent on
this issue. Also worth noting is the legislation of certain states such as Ore-
gon, which has passed legislation to support physician-assisted deaths
through "Death with Dignity" initiatives.9 This state statute specifically "al-
lows terminally ill Oregonians to end their lives through the voluntary self-
administration of lethal medications, expressly prescribed by a physician for
that purpose."O
C. Abortion
Perhaps it is not exactly an end-of-life decision, but abortion is dis-
cussed in this essay primarily for the purpose of comparing the United States
Supreme Court's description of constitutional rights regarding personal au-
tonomy. This narrowly drawn comparison is specifically between how the
Supreme Court has treated decisions regarding physician-assisted deaths and
abortions. It seems logical and necessary to include abortion in the totality of
the conversation of end-of-life determinations even though many uncertain-
ties remain as to the question of the viability of an unborn fetus. Although
this essay will entertain the prominent debate of fetus viability, said debate is
by no means the focal point of this conversation. Rather, abortion appears to
be an obligatory component to any general dialogue involving the constitu-
tional rights pertaining to physician-assisted deaths; therefore, it will be dis-
cussed here as well.
1I. BACKGROUND
A. "Right to Die"
In 1976, the California Natural Death Act was passed and immediately
became the precedent and template for living will statutes." These living
wills were created for individuals with terminal illnesses where death was
imminent, and they were intended "to avoid unwanted life-sustaining treat-
ment that would merely prolong the moment of death."12 It was certainly a
contentious piece of legislation at the time in California, as detractors of the
new statute in the late 1970s worried about the moral questions regarding the
possible overstepping of boundaries by the judicial system.' 3 Some critics
9. The Oregon Death With Dignity Act, OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.805 (West
2005); see also FURROW ET AL., supra note 2, at 1556.
10. FAQs about the Death With Dignity Act, OREGON.GOV (Sept. 22, 2007) http://
www.oregon.gov/DHS/ph/pas/faqs.shtml.
11. Diane Lynn Redleaf, The California Natural Death Act: An Empirical Study of
Physicians' Practices, 31 STAN. L. REV. 913, 917 (1979); NANCY S. JECKER,
ALBERT R. JONSEN & ROBERT A. PEARLMAN, BIOETHICS: AN INTRODUCTION
TO THE HISTORY, METHODS, AND PRACTICE 427 (2d ed. 2007).
12. JECKER ET AL., supra note 11, at 427.
13. Redleaf, supra note II at 918.
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contended that legal solutions to the problem were impracticable, as "statu-
tory standards [would] be either so vague that they provide no guidance or so
rigid that they eliminate necessary flexibility."14 Interestingly, even individ-
uals who supported the California Natural Death Act in principle diverged in
their opinions regarding timing of the decision to end life-sustaining treat-
ment and the degree of control the patient should have in the decision-mak-
ing process.' 5
In the many contemporaneous debates over the California statute, there
was an underlying fear that this state legislation, if passed, would lend itself
to further discussions on the legality of euthanasia.16 There appears to have
been some foreshadowing in these fears, as will be evidenced later in this
essay's discussion. Since 1976, more recent and advanced directives have
been implemented in various states, accounting for the expanded scope of
circumstances in which a mentally incapacitated individual, such as one who
suffers from a persistent vegetative state, may forgo life-sustaining treatment
through a surrogate decision-maker.17
The right-to-die issue was raised in the famous 1990 United States Su-
preme Court case Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health.18 At
the center of the case was Nancy Cruzan, a young woman who had suffered
massive, permanent brain damage from a car accident.' 9 Consequently,
Nancy entered into a persistent vegetative state, rendering her incompetent,
and it "had become apparent that Nancy Cruzan had virtually no chance of
regaining her mental faculties." At this point, her parents requested that she
be taken off life support, knowing that this would cause her death.20 The
hospital employees refused to follow through with the family's request until
it received court approval, so the Cruzan family sought authorization from a
court and the case eventually ended up before the U.S. Supreme Court.21
This particular case invoked the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Consti-
tution, bringing up the issue of whether this amendment provided "a right
under the United States Constitution which would require the hospital to
withdraw life-sustaining treatment from her under these circumstances."22
The Court acknowledged that this was "the first case in which we have been
14. id. at 918 n.22.
15. Id. at 918-19.
16. Id. at 919.
17. See JECKER ET AL., supra note 11, at 427.
18. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 261.
19. Id. at 266.
20. Id. at 266-68.
21. Id. at 268.
22. Id. at 269.
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squarely presented with the issue whether the United States Constitution
grants what is in common parlance referred to as a 'right to die."23
In holding the State's interest in the preservation of life to be more vital
than the quality of life, the majority assumed that a competent patient's right
to die was indeed a protected liberty interest.24 However, the Court did not
grant the surrogate of an incompetent patient with this same constitutional
right.25 In a long, convoluted opinion, the majority ruled that the Fourteenth
Amendment permitted a state to erect the highest evidentiary barrier for a
decision regarding an incompetent patient's right to die; the Court specifi-
cally allowed for a state to impose "heightened evidentiary requirements"
such as clear and convincing evidence of the patient's desire to refuse life-
sustaining treatment. 26
This decision essentially gave states like Missouri the ability to create
the highest evidentiary hurdle possible in a civil case of this kind, as the state
could maintain an unqualified interest in the protection of life. Rather than
being completely clear on the issue of a surrogate decision-maker in such
scenarios, the Court carefully constructed its language in stating that "for
purposes of this case, we assume that the United States Constitution would
grant a competent person a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesav-
ing hydration and nutrition."27 The Court stopped just short of recognizing
an overly broad constitutional right to die. The question of whether a surro-
gate held such a right remained unanswered, leaving the question to the dis-
cretion of the states. So naturally, the topic of medical futility-or the
''reverse right to die"-was even more unclear.
B. Medical Futility
In the past several decades, the physician-patient relationship has drasti-
cally changed from medical paternalism to strong patient autonomy, as pa-
tients displayed a desire to participate fully in the medical decision process
for themselves.2 Along with this shift there has been a gradual increase in
patients and/or their families who claim the right to receive any and all ag-
gressive, high-tech medical interventions, even if their physicians determine
the interventions to be futile because there is "no realistic chance of achiev-
ing the goals of medicine."29 However, it has long been noted that it is not
23. Id. at 277.
24. Id. at 279.
25. See generally id.
26. See id. at 281.
27. Id. at 279 (emphasis added).
28. LAWRENCE J. SCHNEIDERMAN, NANCY S. JECKER & ALBERT R. JONSEN, MEDI-
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always possible for medicine to realize its desired goals, as words that are
fundamental to health care "such as 'heal' (which means 'to make whole')
and 'patient' (which comes from the Latin 'to suffer') suggest that the goal of
medicine is not merely to achieve a means, such as restoring heartbeat, un-
less that means leads to the end of healing the patient."30
Regarding these particular goals, the argument begins with the principle
that physicians are duty-bound to offer "only those treatments that have a
reasonable chance of achieving a therapeutic benefit for the patient."31 One
argument supporting the discretion of health care providers is that a physi-
cian's goal is not merely to treat some part of the body, but rather to benefit
the patient as a whole; the patient should at least have the ability to appreci-
ate such benefits.32 Some argue that this appreciation is inherently impossi-
ble if the patient remains in a persistent vegetative state. 33
Sparse litigation obstructs clarity on the issue of medical futility; it is
rarely litigated in courts throughout the nation for several reasons-the most
obvious being the eventual death of the patient. When a terminally ill patient
is incapacitated and cannot decide for herself whether to continue medically
futile treatment, the laws of most states are vague and unclear as to the neces-
sary steps in deciding for the patient. Herein lies the problem-because it is
not only a matter of choice but also a matter of whether the patient is endur-
ing any physical pain by the maintenance of life-sustaining treatment that
may only prolong the patient's suffering.
These situations become quite contentious because family members are
often understandably distraught by the idea of being responsible for remov-
ing life-sustaining treatment from a loved one. Such a monumental determi-
nation may come with the heavy burden of guilt if the family believes it did
not do everything possible to bring about a cure for the patient. Regardless
of the medical facts of the situation, emotions run high and can overwhelm
the surrogate decision-maker's conscience in a way that ignores reason and
common sense. Thus, when consent becomes difficult or impossible to ob-
tain from the family members of the patient, directives become all the more
necessary to assist the medical professionals in doing what is, in their expert
opinions, essential and beneficial for the patient. The question then becomes
when such directives should control.
Only a modicum of case law regarding medical futility exists and, as
recently as the early 1990s, courts have usually found in favor of the patient
when a physician objects to a patient's request for additional treatment in an
alleged medically futile situation.34 Examples of these judicial tendencies of
30. Id. at 673.
31. Id. at 669.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Judith F. Daar, Medical Futility & Implications for Physician Autonomy, 21
AM. J. L. & MED. 221, 223 (1995).
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the time arise in cases such as In re Jane Doe, where a hospital was enjoined
from de-escalating medical treatment it considered "medical abuse" of a thir-
teen-year-old girl suffering from an irreversible, degenerative neurological
disorder. There the parents of the patient disagreed with the doctors over the
child's course of treatment, as the doctors urged for the treatment to be
terminated.35
Likewise, in the case In re Conservatorship of Wanglie, the patient was
in a persistent vegetative state, and it was clear that she would not recover. 36
The physicians treating the patient suggested to the family that the aggressive
treatment they were providing the patient was of no medical benefit and
should be discontinued.37 The family rejected the physicians' advice, and the
court ultimately ruled in favor of the family. The decision appointed the
husband as the conservator of a permanently unconscious patient over the
objections of the attending physicians.38 Some viewed this case, based on its
practical outcome, as a warning sign marking "the erosion of physician au-
tonomy" in medically futile situations.39
In 1994, In re Baby K involved a similar set of facts to Wanglie in that
the infant patient's family opposed the medical judgment of the physicians,
who had opined that aggressive treatment was inappropriate and futile.40 The
hospital in this case specifically requested for the court to declare that the
hospital had no duty to provide life-sustaining treatment because such care
was "medically and ethically inappropriate."41 The court ruled in favor of
the patient's family in a rather roundabout fashion by relying on the Emer-
gency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA) to conclude that
immediate medical attention in the form of respiratory support was a
mandatory duty of the hospita.42 This reliance on EMTALA would serve
only to complicate the issue of medical futility because such a position would
seem to require medical treatment in virtually every emergency room scena-
rio regardless of the patient's overall prognosis.43
35. See generally In re Jane Doe, 418 S.E.2d 3 (Ga. 1992).
36. See Wanglie, Helga, Ascension Health - Healthcare Ethics - Cases, http://
www.ascensionhealth.org/index.php?option=comcontent&view=article&id=
259&Itemid=173 (last visited Nov. 10, 2010), discussing In re Conservatorship
of Wanglie, No. PX-91-283 (Dist. Prob. Div. Minn. July 1, 1991).
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. Daar, supra note 34, at 225.
40. See generally In re Baby K, 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1994).
41. Id. at 593.
42. Id. at 594-95.
43. Daar, supra note 34, at 227-28.
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There are plenty of other examples from this period where courts have
favored families demanding medically futile treatment.44 A prime example is
the case of a quadriplegic, deaf, blind, and respirator-dependent infant girl
whose mother successfully objected to the physicians' recommendations that
aggressive treatment be withheld.45 Thus, the courts appeared to be leaning
in the same direction in these cases.
However, cases such as Gilgunn v. Massachusetts General Hospital
seem to indicate a possible shift in judicial philosophy. In that case, the jury
found the hospital and doctors were not negligent in issuing a do-not-resusci-
tate (DNR) order for a comatose patient suffering from irreversible brain
damage even though the patient's family member objected to the DNR or-
der.46 This seemed to be a new kind of decision concerning medical futility
in which the court ruled that doctors no longer needed to provide medical
care when they deemed such care to be futile. 47
This back-and-forth game of consent and autonomy in the difficult deci-
sion-making process of this era was well depicted in a cartoon by Gahan
Wilson in the New Yorker Magazine, where Wilson drew a scene showing:
a browbeaten physician kneeling before a tombstone in a ceme-
tery, anxiously fiddling with his stethoscope over the grave.
Standing behind and over him with an intimidating expression is
someone we take to be the wife of the deceased, seemingly de-
manding that the physician perform a miracle. All the physician
can do is submissively look back over his shoulder and apologeti-
cally explain, "I'm afraid there is really very little I can do ...."48
Since the early 1990s, there have been new laws enacted in various
states concerning medical futility; however, the nation as a whole has yet to
reach a consensus as to how to deal with this rare dilemma in which family
members desire to continue medically futile care when faced with the opposi-
tion of expert health care providers.
C. Physician-Assisted Deaths
The highly unpopular notion of physician-assisted death, also referred to
as physician-assisted suicide (PAS), received great notoriety through the in-
44. See John J. Paris et al., Physicians' Refusal of Requested Treatment: The Case
of Baby L, 322 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1012 (1990).
45. Id. at 1013.
46. Gilgunn v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., No. 92-4820 (Mass. Sup. Ct. Apr. 21, 1995),
available at http://www.ascensionhealth.org/index.php?option=comcontent&
view=article&id=245&Itemid=l 73.
47. See Gina Kolata, Court Ruling Limits Rights of Patients, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22,
1995), at 6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1995/04/22/us/court-ruling-
limits-rights-of-patients.html?pagewanted= I &pagewanted=print.
48. Robert D. Truog, Medical Futility, 25 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 985, 987 (2009).
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famous character of Dr. Jack Kevorkian, who was not shy in lending his
medical support to individuals desiring to end their own lives. Oftentimes,
Dr. Kevorkian (sometimes called "Dr. Death") did not have a preexisting
relationship with the patients that sought his assistance, and it was not always
clear that these patients had terminal illnesses.49 However, Kevorkian's
greatest misstep with the law, which led to his ultimate downfall, actually
came through his injection of lethal doses to patients on videotape and send-
ing the recording to media outlets such as the investigative television pro-
gram 60 Minutes.50 This led to the highly publicized trial of Kevorkian and
many national debates on the subject.51
Two major United States Supreme Court cases from 1997 provide back-
ground and a constitutional framework for this issue: Washington v. Gluck-
sberg52 and Vacco v. Quill.53 In Glucksberg, the Court held that "the asserted
'right' to assistance in committing suicide is not a fundamental liberty inter-
est protected by the Due Process Clause [because] Washington's assisted-
suicide ban implicates a number of state interests."54 Therefore, the majority
was clear in establishing that a state ban of any physician assisting in suicide
"does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, either on its face or 'as applied
to competent, terminally ill adults who wish to hasten their deaths by ob-
taining medication prescribed by their doctors."'55
Justice O'Connor's concurrence, however, was more deliberate in dif-
ferentiating between the state's interest concerning an individual wishing to
commit suicide and a terminally ill patient "faced not with the choice of
whether to live, only of how to die."56 The Associate Justice continued to
elaborate on her stance by stating that "the State's legitimate interest in
preventing abuse does not apply to an individual who is not victimized by
abuse, who is not suffering from depression, and who makes a rational and
voluntary decision to seek assistance in dying."57
In Vacco v. Quill, the Supreme Court ruled in the same way, reversing
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.58 The Supreme Court "disagree[d] with
respondents' claim that the distinction between refusing lifesaving medical
49. News Hour with Jim Lehrer (PBS television broadcast Nov. 24, 1998), availa-
ble at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/media/july-dec98/suicidei 1-24.html.
50. Id.
51. See Kevorkian v. Thompson, 947 F. Supp. 1152 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
52. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
53. See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
54. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728.
55. Id. at 735.
56. Id. at 746 (emphasis added).
57. Id. at 747.
58. See Quill, 521 U.S. at 809.
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treatment and assisting suicide [was] 'arbitrary' and 'irrational.' "59 Rather,
the Court upheld the right of the state of New York to treat these two acts
differently, as the Court recognized that "permitting everyone to refuse un-
wanted medical treatment while prohibiting anyone from assisting a suicide
[was] a longstanding and rational distinction."60 The Court was clear in es-
tablishing that "[t]hese valid and important public interests easily satisfy the
constitutional requirement that a legislative classification bear a rational rela-
tion to some legitimate end."61 Thus, by way of Glucksberg and Quill, the
nation received a clear ruling from the highest court that states had the power
and the right to deny individuals the self-initiated process of undergoing phy-
sician-assisted deaths.
With regard to "Death with Dignity" statutes, the lone, radical state that
is unique from every other state in the country is Oregon, as evidenced by its
version of the "Death with Dignity" legislation.62 Although "Death with
Dignity" initiatives were narrowly defeated in the states of California and
Washington,63 the voters of Oregon approved their version of the initiative in
1994, allowing The Oregon Death with Dignity Act to become a state stat-
ute.64 Provided for within the same chapter as the laws concerning powers of
attorney, advance directives for health care, and declarations for mental
health treatment, this particular act regarding "death with dignity" eventually
drew the ire of many people beyond the borders Oregon, including federal
government officials.
There were many challenges brought against Oregon's Death with Dig-
nity Act, but United States Attorney General John Ashcroft brought forth the
most powerful and controversial objection when he "issued a directive which
reinterpreted the Controlled Substances Act as to invalidate Oregon's as-
sisted-suicide law. This was the first time in history that the Controlled Sub-
stances Act was used to preempt state law."65 Attorney General Ashcroft
specifically attempted to reinterpret the Controlled Substances Act by relying
on the "legitimate medical purpose" regulation, something the Executive
Branch had never done before, in order to deem any prescriptions issued and
filled for the purpose of assisting suicide as an illegitimate medical purpose,
59. Id. at 807.
60. Id. at 808.
61. Id. at 809.
62. See The Oregon Death With Dignity Act, OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.805
(West 2005).
63. FURROW ET AL., supra note 2, at 1556.
64. See The Oregon Death With Dignity Act, OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.805
(West 2005); FURROW ET AL., supra note 2, AT 1156.
65. Lindsay R. Kandra, Comment, Questioning the Foundation of Attorney Gen-
eral Ashcroft's Attempt to Invalidate Oregon's Death with Dignity Act, 81 OR.
L. REV. 505, 505 (2002).
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"effectively nullifying the Oregon Act."66 This, in turn, led to a contentious
dispute that went all the way to the United States Supreme Court in Gonzales
v. Oregon, which stands as the current law and will be discussed below.67
D. Abortion
The landmark case of Roe v. Wade hardly needs an introduction; how-
ever, in the interest of being thorough, it is worth reviewing the Supreme
Court's 1973 decision in detail.68 The majority held that there is a constitu-
tional right of privacy, and further elaborated that such a right, "whether it be
founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and re-
strictions upon state action [or] in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of
rights to the people ... is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."69
This constitutional right, of course, could not adequately or logically be
discussed until dealing with the question of the unborn fetus's viability. As
the first step in the debate, if it was established that the fetus was not viable,
then it could be considered as a part of the mother's own body; however, if
the fetus was viable, then it would have be treated as a separate human being.
The appellee and certain amici made the argument that "the fetus is a 'per-
son' within the language and meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment" based
on established medical facts of fetal development.70 The Court even ac-
knowledged-and the appellant aptly conceded-that if such a "suggestion
of personhood [was] established, the appellant's case, of course, collapses,
for the fetus' right to life would then be guaranteed specifically by the
Amendment."71
However, the Court refused to redefine the Constitution's interpretation
of personhood by stating that the United States Constitution only narrowly
refers to the term "person" in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.72
Since this section has been discussed throughout this essay, it is worthwhile
to examine it in its entirety, as the critical term "person" is used throughout:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, lib-
66. Id. at 518.
67. See generally Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
68. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
69. Id. at 153.
70. Id. at 156.
71. Id. at 156-57.
72. Id. at 157.
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erty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.73
The Court in Roe v. Wade mentioned that the Fourteenth Amendment,
"in defining 'citizens,' speaks of 'persons born or naturalized in the United
States' . . [and t]he word also appears in the Due Process Clause and in the
Equal Protections clause." 74 After considering other places within the Con-
stitution in which "person" is mentioned, the Court decidedly remarked that
"in nearly all these instances, the use of the word is such that it has applica-
tion only postnatally [and] none indicates, with any assurance, that it has any
possible prenatal application."75 Therefore, the Court was clear in observing
that "the word 'person,' as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not in-
clude the unborn."76 The Supreme Court established the legal principle that a
fetus within a pregnant woman could not be seen as its own person, meaning
it was ultimately still a natural part of the mother.
So it was determined that the right of personal privacy, albeit a right that
the Court noted was "not unqualified," included the right of a woman to
abort the fetus, as this was her constitutional right regarding medical treat-
ment to her own body.77 The Court further held that only a "compelling state
interest" could justify any state regulation limiting the right of privacy of a
woman desiring to undergo an abortion.78 This opinion still stands as bind-
ing precedent today.
III. CURRENT LAW
A. "Right to Die"
The holding and impact from the United States Supreme Court case of
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health remains good law to-
day.79 The Cruzan family suffered a great deal in the process of the highly
publicized case, and the heavy burdens and moral dilemmas proved to be too
much for Nancy Cruzan's father, Joe, who committed suicide in 1996 after
suffering bouts of depression.80
Of course, the case also has had an impact in the decisions of courts
throughout the country, as the case has often been cited in discussions of
end-of-life determinations following the Supreme Court's finding that a pa-
73. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
74. Roe, 410 U.S. at 157.
75. Id. at 157.
76. Id. at 158.
77. Id. at 154.
78. Id. at 155.
79. See generally Cruzan v. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
80. Peter Annin & Mark Peyser. A Father's Sorrow: Joe Cruzan's Struggle Ends
with Suicide, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 2, 1996, at 54.
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tient has the right to forgo medical treatment. 8' And although some courts
have turned to the United States Constitution, the Supreme Court's interpre-
tation of the Fourteenth Amendment has given lower courts the confidence to
look elsewhere for the same right, such as in state statutes, state common
law, or even state constitutions.82
Since Chief Justice Rehnquist noted in Cruzan that "the informed con-
sent doctrine has become firmly entrenched in American tort law," 83 nearly
every state court that recognizes a right to refuse life-sustaining treatment has
recognized that particular right of an individual in state common law, typi-
cally in the form of informed consent.8 4 Examples of states finding such a
right in their state statutes can be seen in Connecticut and Illinois.85 But
perhaps the strongest type of support for the right to die that one could locate
is in a state constitution because it likely cannot be reviewed by the United
States Supreme Court, and it is not subject to alteration by the state's legisla-
ture. 86 Various examples of these provisions in state constitutions can be
found in Florida, Arizona, and California.87
B. Medical Futility
Current case law on the topic of medical futility is still quite muddled.
One of the most recent cases on point is the case of Bernstein v. Superior
Court, which serves as a prime example of a typical sequence of events when
the jurisdiction lacks a clear directive under which physicians may operate. 88
The California Superior Court recently dealt with the idea of medical futility
from the perspective of a family dispute "regarding the level of appropriate
care that should be provided" to the patient.89 The court found that the fam-
ily member pursuing life-prolonging measures was "not acting in good faith
81. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 737 (1997); Schiavo ex rel.
Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1289, 1294 (11 th Cir. 2005); Compassion in
Dying v. Washington, 85 F.3d 1440, 1443 (9th Cir. 1996); Kevorkian v.
Thompson, 947 F. Supp. 1152, 1166 (E.D. Mich. 1997); Conservatorship of
Wendland, 28 P.3d 151, 159 (Cal. 2001).
82. FURROW, ET AL., supra note 2, at 1435.
83. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269.
84. FURROW, ET AL., supra note 2, at 1435.
85. See McConnell v. Beverly Enters. Conn., Inc., 553 A.2d 596, 602 (Conn.
1989); In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 297 (1989).
86. FURROW, ET AL., supra note 2, at 1436.
87. See FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 23; ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, § 8; Bouvia v. Superior
Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 301 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
88. Bernstein v. Superior Court, No. B212067, 2009 WL 224942 (Cal. Ct. App.
Feb. 2, 2009).
89. Bernstein, 2009 WL 224942 at *1.
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or in [the patient]'s best interests [because he] had not based his health care
decisions on medical advice."90
Much can be learned from a more detailed look into this particular case.
The 79-year-old patient, Karl Bernstein, had two sons, Ilya and Nicholas,
through his marriage of 28 years with Olga Bernstein, and one son, Scot
Bernstein, by a prior marriage.91 Doctors officially diagnosed Karl, who had
suffered degenerative symptoms for a number of years, with Alzheimer's
disease in April of 1999.92 Following the initial diagnosis, Karl's condition
worsened during the next few years as he was transferred from one health
care facility to another, only to return to one of the first hospitals he had
visited-Los Robles Hospital.93 At Los Robles, the family members began
to dispute "the level of appropriate care that should be provided to Karl con-
cerning orders to or not to resuscitate (DNR)."94
Scot officially became Karl's temporary conservator in April of 2003
after reaching a settlement with Olga, who agreed to turn over the conserva-
torship to Scot because she was unable to pay for the expense of opposing
him as conservator and was unable to "cope with the stress of litigation and
Karl's illness."95 Among the express requirements set forth in the agreement
was the condition "that Scot would adhere to physician recommendations."96
Soon thereafter, Karl became "completely bedridden, non-communicative,
fully contracted in a fetal position, incontinent, unable to eat or swallow,
and . . . unable to undertake any volitional act." 97 The doctors found him to
be in a persistent vegetative state, or PVS, and for "the last six years, while
unable to consent to medical treatment, Karl received a number of invasive
procedures to keep him alive."98
During this time, Karl suffered from a lack of "meaningful rest or sleep"
due to the distortion of his legs underneath his body, an inability to "process
the nutrition provided through the feeding tube rendering him extremely thin
and wasted," recurring infections such as pneumonia due to the tracheostomy
tube, and intramuscular antibiotic injections that the physicians determined
were "too painful to continue given their lack of therapeutic value." 99 Ilya
and Nicholas "contended that Scot had abused his authority as conservator
90. Id. at *12.
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by . . . demanding a series of painful and invasive treatments having no
medical or therapeutic value for Karl."oo This led to their request for the
trial court to change the conservatorship from Scot to Olga, because Scot was
not acting in the best interests of Karl, who "spoke of his own death in his
handwritten journal [wanting] 'some pleasure and comfort out of life, as well
as to add to the pleasure and comfort of others."o101
Various doctors involved in Karl's treatment unanimously concluded
that "Karl [was] in a persistent vegetative state ... [, and] most, if not all, of
the medical staff believe[d ] that Karl experience[d] some amount of pain."102
Furthermore, the court-ordered report showed "that the doctors have deter-
mined a number of procedures and treatments are futile ... [and] essentially
all of the treatments Karl is currently receiving are inappropriate and the
family should withdraw support altogether ... [because] there is minimal, if
anything, that can be done to change his condition."03
The trial court ruled in favor of the respondents as it "appointed Ilya as
conservator and [simultaneously] denied Scot's request for a further hearing"
on the issue.104 The court rejected Scot's argument that there was "no evi-
dence that his behavior negatively impacted Karl's care."10 5 The court also
rejected Scot's further argument that "through his diligence, Karl [had] re-
ceived excellent care," because he made the decision as the conservator, at
the time, to ignore the medical advice of the treating physicians.106 The trial
court based its decision largely on the evidence that "Scot was not acting in
good faith or in Karl's best interest," and that Karl's stated desires were not
being met because his "present condition was uncomfortable and painful, not
pleasurable for him, and his suffering causes stress for all his family . . .
[while] the Bioethics Committee concluded there was no treatment that had
therapeutic value for Karl's condition."07
The respondents primarily focused on a request to "prohibit medical
treatments that are painful and medically futile, such as intramuscular antibi-
otic injections, discontinue feeding methods that are painful and futile, and
remove the tracheostomy tube."108 The court also "rejected the 'clear and
convincing standard,' stating that the 'preponderance test' applied in this
100. Id.
101. See id. at *3.
102. Id. at *4.
103. Id.
104. See id. at *11.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at *3.
108. Id.
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case."109 In response to the trial court's ruling, Scot appealed contending
"the trial court abused its discretion in removing him as conservator."'10
The appellate court found that the trial court "applied the proper burden
of proof and properly found that Scot was not acting in good faith or in
Karl's best interests because Scot's judgment and objectivity were im-
paired.""' The basic rationale for this finding is the idea that Scot went
against the medical advice of the treating doctors when making health care
decisions for Karl since the physicians unanimously agreed that "Karl has
been in a persistent or chronic vegetative state for several years with no hope
of recovery, the painful and futile medical procedures should be terminated,
he should be placed on a DNR order, and he should be moved to a sub-acute
care facility."12
The court rejected any application of the Conservatorship of Wendland
case "in determining whether or not to allow removal of nutrition, hydration,
and respiratory care" because Karl was not "conscious," and the evidence
was undisputed that Karl had no hope of recovery due to his PVS. 113 Al-
though Karl did show some type of "awareness," it was only "in response to
certain medical treatments ... [and a] showing of discomfort [did] not render
Karl 'conscious' within the meaning of Wendland."114 Moreover, the Court
rejected any theory that "a person could be both in a persistent vegetative
state and conscious at the same time . . . [because] the terms are mutually
exclusive.", 15
The court denied Scot's request for a further hearing based on the Pro-
bate Code Section 2355, which clearly states that it "does not require a fur-
ther hearing for the court to give its approval of a conservator's decision to
withdraw medical treatment, or guarantee an interested party the right to
have a hearing should the interested party take issue with a decision as the
conservator."]16 The court then further elaborated its stance by explaining,
"[c]ourts have held that judicial intervention in right-to-die cases should be
minimal [as they] are not the proper place to resolve the agonizing personal
problems that underlie these cases."7
Thus, the court agreed that "[n]ot only [was] there no useful purpose in
having a further hearing on the subject of the removal of life sustaining treat-
109. Id. at *11.
110. Id.
111. Id. at *12.
112. Id.
113. Id. (comparing Conservatorship of Wendland, 28 P.3d 151 (Cal. 2001)).
114. Id. at *13.
115. Id. at *13 n.2.
116. Id.
117. Id. at *14 (citing Conservatorship of Morrison, 206 Cal. App. 3d 304, 312
(1988)).
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ment ... [but] such a hearing would only compound the damage done to
[Karl] and this family . . .by [Scot].""18 Moreover, the court declared that
the Bernstein family had "suffered enough."119
The current controlling law in the state of Texas is found in the Texas
Advance Directives Act of 1999, which is "groundbreaking and unique."120
Also colloquially referred to as the "Texas Futility Statute," this landmark act
has been influential in the surrogate decision-making process when there is a
dispute over end-of-life treatment for an incapacitated patient. 2 The statute
lays out a step-by-step procedure, and below is a notable subsection of the
statute describing the necessary steps to follow:
(e) If the patient or the person responsible for the health care decisions
of the patient is requesting life-sustaining treatment that the attending physi-
cian has decided and the review process has affirmed is inappropriate treat-
ment, the patient shall be given available life-sustaining treatment pending
transfer under Subsection (d). The patient is responsible for any costs in-
curred in transferring the patient to another facility. The physician and the
health care facility are not obligated to provide life-sustaining treatment after
the 10th day after the written decision required under Subsection (b) is pro-
vided to the patient or the person responsible for the health care decisions of
the patient unless ordered to do so under Subsection (g).122
The reference to subsection (g) is significant because it indicates that the
state legislature actually acknowledges and understands the sensitive nature
of medically futile scenarios:
(g) At the request of the patient or the person responsible for the
health care decisions of the patient, the appropriate district or
county court shall extend the time period provided under Subsec-
tion (e) only if the court finds, by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, that there is a reasonable expectation that a physician or
health care facility that will honor the patient's directive will be
found if the time extension is granted.123
The arduous and straining litigation process in medical futility circum-
stances can only make the process more difficult for the family involved-
which is perhaps one reason there is little case law on the issue.124 Fortu-
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Robert L. Fine, Medical Futility and the Texas Advance Directives Act of 1999,
BAYLOR UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER, April 13, 2000, http://www.pubmed
central.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid= 1312296.
121. See generally TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.046 (Vernon 2003).
122. Id. § 166.046(e).
123. Id. § 166.046(g) (emphasis added).
124. Id. § 166.046.
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nately, statutes such as the one in Texas have clarified a blurry issue by
defining a specific number of days that a medically futile patient may receive
life-sustaining treatment. 125 During this ten-day period, there are several
things that can happen, such as the family's eventual acquiescence to the
doctors' opinions, the death of the patient, or a continued impasse period.126
Although it is far from an ideal statute, it appears to be a step in the right
direction as it provides the proper procedure if a physician is not effectuating
a patient's directive or treatment decision.127
C. Physician-Assisted Deaths
The two United States Supreme Court cases of Washington v. Gluck-
sberg and Vacco v. Quill have yet to be overturned. So generally speaking,
states continue to maintain the constitutional right and ability to deny indi-
viduals the self-initiated process of undergoing physician-assisted deaths, or
PAS, if the state desires to do so. 28 In Glucksberg, the Supreme Court deter-
mined that the Fourteenth Amendment did not protect the rights of an indi-
vidual regarding physician-assisted suicide.129 Looking closely and carefully
at the nation's long "history, legal traditions, and practices ... that direct and
restrain [the Court's] exposition of the Due Process Clause,"130 the Court
cited a "consistent and almost universal tradition that has long rejected the
asserted right, and continues explicitly to reject it today, even for the termi-
nally ill, mentally competent adults."131
It was true then, and it remains true today, that physician-assisted death
is controversial and unpopular, as typified by President Clinton during his
term, when he "signed the Federal Assisted Suicide Funding Restriction Act
of 1997, which prohibits the use of federal funds in support of physician-
assisted suicide."32 This legislation passed by Clinton helps to identify a
concrete foundation in the current law of the United States in general.33
This sentiment is not restricted to the federal level, but also "the overwhelm-
ing majority of States explicitly [prohibit] assisted suicide."'134 Although the
125. Id. § 166.046(e).
126. Id.
127. Id. § 166.046(a).
128. See generally Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Vacco v. Quill,
521 U.S. 793 (1997).
129. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 721, 723.
132. Id. at 718.
133. Id. at 718-19.
134. Id. (citing IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 707A.3 (1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-60-1,
11-60-3 (1996)).
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Supreme Court has recognized that an individual has a right to refuse un-
wanted medical treatment, the Court generally favors the countervailing state
interests, including the deep-rooted public disapproval of suicide, to prohibit
PAS. 135
Likewise, in Quill, the Court essentially distinguished between physi-
cian-assisted suicide and the more passive approach of euthanasia, which was
manifest through the differences in causation and intent of the two circum-
stances.136 Specifically, the Court explained that "when a patient refuses life-
sustaining medical treatment, he dies from an underlying fatal disease or pa-
thology; but if a patient ingests lethal medication prescribed by a physician,
he is killed by that medication."137 As to the intent, the Court noted that a
form of passive euthanasia by refusing life-sustaining treatment would be to
respect the wishes of the patient, whereas a drug-induced death would be to
cause the patient's death.38 Thus, prohibiting PAS has long been and con-
tinues to be the precedent.39
Of course, referring to the law regarding PAS as "general" implies that
there are exceptions, and in this case that would be the state of Oregon.140
Section 127.085(1) of the Oregon Death with Dignity Act holds that:
An adult who is capable, is a resident of Oregon, and has been
determined by the attending physician and consulting physician to
be suffering from a terminal disease, and who has voluntarily ex-
pressed his or her wish to die, may make a written request for
medication for the purpose of ending his or her life in a humane
and dignified manner .... 141
This remarkable shift away from the national trend regarding physician-
assisted suicide is a great rarity among the states. 42 The fact that Oregon's
statute is completely contrary to the general law of the nation may help ex-
plain why Attorney General John Ashcroft made an effort to invalidate Ore-
gon's assisted suicide statute. 43 As discussed above, Ashcroft, using the
powers of the Executive Branch, attempted to reinterpret the Controlled Sub-
stances Act by relying on the "legitimate medical purpose" regulation so that
135. Id. at 773; Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 809 (1997).
136. Quill, 521 U.S. at 800-801.
137. Id. at 801 (emphasis added).
138. Id. at 801-802.
139. See Washington, 521 U.S. at 718.
140. The Oregon Death With Dignity Act, OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.805(1) (West
2005).
141. Id. § 127.805(1).
142. Washington, 521 U.S. at 718.
143. Kandra, supra note 65, at 518.
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any prescriptions issued and filled for the purpose of assisting suicide, or
anything similar, would be viewed as an illegitimate medical purpose.1 44
However, Ashcroft's attempts were foiled as seen in the case of Gonza-
les v. Oregon, where the United States Supreme Court held in its majority
opinion that the Controlled Substances Act's "prescription requirement does
not authorize the Attorney General to bar dispensing controlled substances
for assisted suicide in the face of a state medical regime permitting such
conduct ... [because] Congress did not have this far-reaching intent to alter
the federal-state balance and the congressional role in maintaining it."145
Even Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion acknowledged that the "prohibition
or deterrence of assisted suicide is certainly not among the enumerated pow-
ers conferred on the United States by the Constitution, and it is within the
realm of public morality (bonos mores) traditionally addressed by the so-
called police power of the States."146 Thus, Oregon's unique statute remains
to stand as controlling law in the state for purposes of physician-assisted
suicide.
D. Abortion
Roe v. Wade was decided almost four decades ago; however, it remains
controversial today, and it is heavily debated in political discussion, espe-
cially during election season. In the many years since the case was decided,
Harris Poll results indicate that although general attitudes towards the deci-
sion have fluctuated over time, the 2006 poll shows that it is now almost an
even split in public opinion:147
144. Id.
145. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 274-75 (2006) (emphasis added).
146. Id. at 298.
147. U.S. Attitudes Toward Roe v. Wade, WALL ST. J. (May 4, 2006), available at
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/info-harris0503.html.
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Subsequent decisions to Roe v. Wade have been equally contentious.
The Supreme Court had the opportunity to change its prior ruling when it
heard the case of Webster v. Reproductive Health Services. Justice Scalia
was clear in his desire to "reconsider and explicitly overrule Roe v. Wade,"
however, he was in the minority.4 8 Justice Rehnquist, who authored the ma-
jority opinion, considered it moot to reconsider Roe v. Wade, thus the crux of
the original decision did not change.49 The issue arose again in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey in 1992; however, Roe v.
Wade again emerged unchanged as the Court applied the doctrine of stare
decisis in reaffirming its original decision.150
Although many attempts have been made to overturn Roe v. Wade, the 1973
case continues to remain as binding precedent today.'5' Regardless, there
have been very different views from the various states. If the power to regu-
late abortion is returned to the states by a reversal of Roe v. Wade, some
states would be able to enforce related laws they have since passed, which
range from making abortion illegal to ensuring it is legal.152
IV. ANALYSIS
A. "Right to Die"
In evaluating the case law regarding the right to die, this essay looks
specifically to the case of Cruzan.153 Rather than raising the issue of privacy,
in which the level of scrutiny tends to be very strict, the United States Su-
preme Court classified the competent person's interest in the preservation of
life as a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause.154 Chief
Justice Rehnquist explained the importance of preserving life as an interest
that outweighs the quality of life.155 In fact, Missouri was held to have an
unqualified interest in the protection of life.156
But it cannot be overlooked that the majority opinion only assumed that
a competent patient's right to die was indeed a protected liberty interest,
while a surrogate decision-maker of an incompetent patient was not granted
148. Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 496 (1989).
149. Id. at 512.
150. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 833-34 (1992).
151. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
152. Christine Vestal, States Probe Limits of Abortion Policy, STATELINE, (June 11,
2007), http://www.stateline.org/live/ViewPage.action?siteNodeld=136&lan-
guageld= I &contentld= 121780.
153. See generally Cruzan v. Dir. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
154. Id. at 262.
155. Id. at 335-36.
156. Id. at 282.
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the same constitutional right.157 Even though the Court recognized what
seemed to be a constitutional right to die, there were still unanswered ques-
tions remaining as the Court did not specifically answer whether a surrogate
held the same right, which consequently leaves the problem to the discretion
of each individual state without uniformity.
The four dissenting judges did well to highlight the perspective that the
right to die was the most intimate decision a person could make. And just as
issues of privacy are under strict scrutiny, this issue should be the same. 58
Still, considering patient autonomy and the notion that there are fundamental
rights, it was valuable for the Court to come to a general consensus on the
issue of a competent patient's right to refuse medical treatment.159 However,
this conclusion (or rather, assumption) by the Court only scratched the sur-
face of the right-to-die issue. The most litigious controversy arises when the
patient is effectively incompetent, incapacitated, and/or incapable of making
his/her own decisions regarding current and future medical treatment. It
would help the lower courts if, in addition to a competent patient's right to
die, the Supreme Court also decisively explained the constitutional rights of
surrogate decision-makers. This would certainly resolve many of the uncer-
tainties that torture families involved in "Catch-22" scenarios, such as in the
cases of the families of Nancy Cruzan and Terry Schiavo.160
B. Medical Futility
Using the case of Bernstein v. Superior Court as a platform to discuss
some of the problematic ways in which courts have ruled, one obstacle to
clarity is that the court was deferential to the trial court's opinion, as it sim-
ply borrowed language from the lower court to explain its holding.161 The
facts of this case happened to be advantageous for the respondents, whom the
court noted had the benefit of "undisputed and overwhelming evidence
presented at the evidentiary hearing" in their favor. 162 The court even admit-
ted that it wanted to remain deferential and relatively quiet on this highly
sensitive right-to-die issue. 63
The court's level of silence on medical futility was disappointing at
best. The court did well to cite to past cases within its own jurisdiction to
157. Id. at 279.
158. Id. at 303-05.
159. Id. at 279.
160. See generally id.; Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1289 (11 th
Cir. 2005).
161. See generally Bernstein v. Super. Ct., No. B212067, 2009 WL 224942, at
*13-14 (Cal. App. 2 Dist., Feb. 2, 2009).
162. Id. at *15.
163. Id. at *14.
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determine perspectives and definitions regarding the topic.164 But the court
also missed a golden opportunity to enhance the dialogue regarding medical
futility. This court could have had a greater impact on the rarely litigated
subject of medical futility for future courts to look to, not only within the
state of California, but also around the nation since there is very little case
law on the issue. Yet the court chose the minimalist route.165
The court failed to refer to cases like Causey v. St. Francis Medical
Center, even through a simple footnote could have shined more light on the
topic.166 California would likely have been well-served had this court
gleaned more from the sensitive rendering of the medical futility problem
provided by the Causey court.167 In this particular Louisiana case, the court
looked to the "subjective value judgments" used to determine futility "in
terms of personal values, not in terms of medical science."'168 The court
seemed to understand the very sensitive nature of such a "conflict over val-
ues, i.e., whether extra days obtained through medical intervention are worth
the burden and costs."169
This was in stark contrast to the Bernstein court, which took the less
controversial route of looking only at the specific situation at hand, where the
facts clearly painted a picture of an end-of-life patient in great pain and with-
out hope.170 While the Causey court looked to a myriad of issues such as a
"physician's obligation to obtain informed consent [which] is both an ethical
requirement and a legal standard of care derived from principles of individual
integrity and self determination,"171 the Bernstein court merely stated "judi-
cial intervention in 'right to die' cases should be minimal,"72 effectively shy-
ing away from addressing persuasive cases from other jurisdictions that
might be of benefit to future medical futility cases in the state and country.
The court could also have chosen to examine statutes from other states deal-
ing with medical futility, such as the landmark Texas Advance Directives
Act of 1999.173 However, the court in Bernstein failed to do anything of the
sort when drafting its recent decision.
164. See id.
165. See generally id.
166. See generally Causey v. St. Francis Med. Ctr., 719 So. 2d 1072 (La. Ct. App.
1998).
167. See generally id.
168. Id. at 1074.
169. Id. at 1075.
170. See generally Bernstein, 2009 WL 224942, at *4.
171. Causey, 719 So. 2d at 1075.
172. Bernstein, 2009 WL 224942 at *14.
173. Texas Advance Directives Act, TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166
(Vernon 1999).
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The topic of informed consent providing a discussion on the issue of
individual autonomy is also lacking in the Bernstein court's decision.74 The
Cruzan decision is a binding decision by the U.S. Supreme Court that this
court could have referred to for a discussion on individual autonomy.175 Al-
though the facts in Cruzan are different from Bernstein, it is beneficial in
terms of examining the constitutional rights associated with permitting a state
to create a high evidentiary barrier for an incompetent patient's right to
die.176
In Cruzan, the patient suffered a massive brain injury from an automo-
bile accident, which led to her entering into a persistent vegetative state. 77
There was evidence in "Cruzan's expression to a former housemate that she
would not wish to continue on with her life if sick or injured unless she could
live at least halfway normally suggested that she would not wish to continue
on with her nutrition and hydration."78 However, the Missouri Supreme
Court disagreed with the idea that her surrogate decision-makers were ulti-
mately permitted to determine her end-of-life choices, "concluding that no
person can assume that choice for an incompetent in the absence of the for-
malities required by the Living Will statute or clear and convincing evidence
of the patient's wishes."'179
The debate hinged on the question of whether the Fourteenth Amend-
ment of the U.S. Constitution allowed a state to create a high, "clear and
convincing evidence standard" in determining an incompetent patient's right
to die.180 The petitioners in Cruzan "insist[ed] that under the general hold-
ings of [the Court's] cases, the forced administration of life-sustaining medi-
cal treatment and even of artificially delivered food and water essential to
life, would implicate a competent person's liberty interest."'8' They also ar-
gued "an incompetent person should possess the same right [of refusing life-
saving hydration and nutrition] as is possessed by a competent person."82
The majority of the justices assumed that the right to die is a protected
liberty interest of a competent patient.183 Although the Supreme Court has
proven to be somewhat elusive in these controversial right-to-die cases, this
174. See generally Bernstein, 2009 WL 224942.
175. See generally Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
176. See id. at 286-87.
177. See id. at 261.
178. Id. at 26 1.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 263.
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does not excuse the California court from addressing medical futility to the
fullest, because a healthy discussion in an opinion would be beneficial to all.
The topic of medical futility is nebulous and as medical technology ad-
vances, the question of whether medical intervention is ever medically futile
will increasingly become a subject of heated debate. Texas is still one of
only a few states with such a specific statute concerning medical futility, but
even Section 166.046 of the Texas Health & Safety Code falls short in many
respects. As the statute currently stands, there are many situations where a
person with neither an irreversible nor terminable condition can have the
statute used against them.184 Society as a whole can only benefit when there
is greater dialogue on controversial topics such as medical futility. Cases
like Bernstein provide very little aid when much is needed. There seems to
be little regard for guidance in the opinions of such important and rare cases.
Simply put, the Bernstein court fell short when there was great opportunity to
clarify the law.
As there has yet to be an established, clear consensus on the question of
who exactly has the power to demand medical treatment-and who has the
power to refuse treatment-both the patients' and physicians' perspectives
must be properly framed by asking the two following questions:
[1)] Do patients and families have a right to force doctors to
squander scarce time and resources on therapies that have no ben-
efit in order to satisfy their irrational wishes? [and 2)] Do doctors
have a right to arbitrarily ignore the values and preferences of pa-
tients and families using their own value systems to make life and
death decisions for others?85
It is in the response to these questions that we see the varying perspec-
tives on the dilemma of medical futility. As irreconcilable as the two queries
appear to be, they must be posed in conjunction because the breadth of the
medical futility problem cannot be touched without a full examination of the
issues. Texas has taken a step toward this type of proposition by including
not only specific directives for transferring a patient that desires to continue
medically futile treatment against the will of that patient's doctor, but also
provisions within the statute to account for the difficult decision-making pro-
cess, as the Texas medical futility statute has allows for the possibility of
reasonable extensions.186
C. Physician-Assisted Deaths
There is not an end-of-life determination more scrutinized in the United
States than the physician-assisted death. The commonly used phrase, "physi-
cian-assisted suicide (PAS)," connotes a whole new level of negativity in that
184. See generally TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.046 (Vernon 1999).
185. Robert D. Truog, Medical Futility, 25 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 985, 987-88 (2009).
186. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.046(g) (Vernon 1999).
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it implies that the decision to follow through with a physician-assisted death
is no longer a medical decision, but rather something much worse, perhaps a
morally wrong one. This essay does not attempt to agree with or attack this
end-of-life decision. Rather, it is a useful academic exercise to compare this
particular category of end-of-life determinations with others that are more
accepted, or at least viewed with less disfavor.
Additionally, Dr. Jack Kevorkian is regarded by some as one of the
most reviled physicians of our time. In fact, "Dr. Death" actually prevailed
as a defendant in cases before the Supreme Court of Michigan, where he was
on trial for the murder of two women. 87 In People v. Kevorkian, Kevorkian
appealed the two counts of murder for which he was charged in assisting two
people in committing suicide.88 Each woman was suffering from a condi-
tion that caused "great pain or was severely disabling," so Dr. Kevorkian met
them at a cabin in 1991 and set up machines that allowed the individuals to
end their lives.189 The Supreme Court of Michigan held that a defendant
could be charged for murder "[o]nly where there is probable cause to believe
that death was the direct and natural result of defender's act", not "[w]here a
defendant merely is involved in the events leading up to the death, such as
providing the means."190 The court reversed and remanded in favor of Dr.
Kevorkian but the state of Michigan was more successful in a jury trial in
1999, where Kevorkian was convicted and sentenced to 10 to 25 years in
prison for the murder of Thomas Youk. 19 1
Kevorkian's eventual conviction may have been due to his arrogance in
the physician-assisted suicides, going so far as to dare the legal system to
stop him from continuing with the procedures. 92 However, some might ar-
gue that he never stood a chance in a jury trial of this magnitude, as his good
fortune may have inevitably run out. Although PAS is just as painless and
achieves the same end as the procedures pertaining to an individual's right to
die or even in cases of medical futility, it has never been well-received in the
public eye. As has been already mentioned, the only state with a legitimate
statute termed "Death with Dignity Act" is Oregon, where a terminally ill
patient may request in writing medication to end his or her life.193 Interest-
ingly enough, this statute rings a completely different tone from the rest of
187. People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1994).
188. Id.
189. Id. at 733.
190. Id. at 738-39.
191. Dirk Johnson, Kevorkian Sentenced to 10 to 25 Years in Prison, N.Y. TIMES
(April 14, 1999), available at http://www.nytimes.com/1999/04/14/uskevor-
kian-sentenced-to- 10-to-25-years-in-prison.html ?pagewanted= I &pagewanted=
print.
192. Id.
193. The Oregon Death with.Dignity Act, OR. REV. STAT. § 127.805 (West 2005).
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the nation with the last few words of the Section 127.805(1) stating that the
ending of life is performed "in a humane and dignified manner."94 While
"physician-assisted suicide" carries a pessimistic tenor, Oregon turns the pro-
cedure into something almost glorious. The dichotomy is nothing short of
astonishing.
Even the state of Oregon does not wholly agree with PAS, as Oregon
voters approved the statute by the narrowest of margins at 51%-49%. 195 And
there were several challenges to the controversial statute, as Attorney Gen-
eral Ashcroft attempted to invalidate the state legislation for all intents and
purposes. 196 In addition, there were many obstacles to implement the act
initially, as evidenced by a federal district judge issuing a preliminary injunc-
tion in an effort to bar the statute's provisions, only to be followed by Ore-
gon's own legislature challenging the act one last time in a House Bill.197
After finally becoming law in the state of Oregon, there has been substantial
criticism of the statute, but there have also been efforts by other states to
enact similar statutes, albeit without much success. 198
It is also worth contemplating the constitutional rights, or lack thereof,
concerning an individual's desire to engage in a physician-assisted death or
euthanasia when confronted with unbearable pain. The question must be
asked: when a competent person's right to make decisions about life and
death was clearly recognized in cases such as Cruzan'99 what is the extent of
such a right, by way of substantive due process, to make similar end-of-life
decisions when the patient is not under a form of life-sustaining treatment
such as a respirator? It can be argued that oftentimes, patients seeking PAS
are in even greater pain and might be solely surviving on a feeding tube.
And technicalities classify some patients as individuals facing right-to-die
end-of-life decisions, while others are not. For public policy reasons, the
Supreme Court has determined that suicide, for federal purposes, is not a
fundamental right even though it deals with the same end-of-life determina-
tion that Cruzan and Schiavo had faced.200 Whether such determinations are
similar to these two classes of patients is perhaps a futile effort in and of
itself, since the general public opinion, based on state laws, show that the
vast majority of states agree with keeping these two categories distinct from
each other.
194. § 127.805(1).
195. Kandra, supra note 65, at 508.
196. Id. at 505.
197. Id. at 5 l1.
198. FuRROW ET AL., supra note 2, at 1565 n.6.
199. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 270 (1990).
200. See generally id.; Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1289 (11 th
Cir. 2005).
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D. Abortion
Finally, in analyzing the topic of abortion in relation to other end-of-life
decisions, this essay examines the relatively longstanding rule that a woman
has the right over her own body and the fetus during pregnancy. 201 Tied to
the constitutional right to privacy, a woman holds a qualified right to termi-
nate her pregnancy even though the state has "legitimate interests in protect-
ing both the pregnant woman's health and the potentiality of human life, each
of which grows and reaches a 'compelling' point at various stages of the
woman's approach to term."202
In this heated debate, the popular terms representing the opposing sides
are labeled as "pro-life" vs. "pro-choice." The supporters of the latter enjoy
a level of protection of the Due Process clause in making their argument, for
it was in providing a constitutional right to privacy to pregnant women that
the Supreme Court effectively established a very strict level of scrutiny, mak-
ing it quite difficult to overcome a pregnant woman's individual private in-
terest in making a determination for her body and fetus up to a certain point
in the pregnancy. The Court was adamant in stating that where "certain 'fun-
damental rights' are involved, the Court has held that regulation limiting
these rights may be justified only by 'compelling state interest.'"203 This
places a high burden on those that take the "pro-life" stance, and the Court
used this language despite several amici referring to medical data arguing
that "the fetus is a 'person' within the language and meaning of the Four-
teenth Amendment." 204
Therefore, despite contentious medical data set before the Court, the
powerful and broad constitutional right of privacy was provided to pregnant
women who wanted personal autonomy over their own body and the poten-
tial body of the fetus.205 Some "pro-life" advocates would even argue that
the Roe v. Wade decision was based on a technicality of the term "person" in
the Fourteenth Amendment, and the absence of a reference to the unborn
carried great weight in the eventual decision of the Court.206
In stark contrast to the Roe v. Wade opinion, even when medical data
has been used to speak not to the viability of a fetus, but rather the pain and
suffering an individual endures under certain terminal illness conditions,
there has been no constitutional right afforded to these patients. There ap-
pears to be an inherent logical flaw in how an individual holds the constitu-
tional right regarding one's own body and that of an unborn fetus, while that
201. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
202. Id. at 114.
203. Id. at 155.
204. Id. at 156.
205. Id. at 153.
206. Id. at 158.
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same right is withheld from a medical patient in great physical anguish when
attempting to make a decision on his or her own body alone.
How can the two divergent opinions on the same of constitutional right
be reconciled? Some women make the decision to undergo an abortion to
protect their quality of life, not necessarily for the preservation of life. How-
ever, some terminally ill patients face more dire circumstances when desiring
to protect the quality of life due to the fact that their physical pains outweigh
the value of their own life. Some may argue that PAS is the "taking away"
of a life, while an abortion of a fetus is simply a personal decision since the
fetus is not a viable "person;" however, these distinctions between the two
decisions become more questionable when cautiously examining the quality
of life issue.
V. CONCLUSION
It may seem unfair to take all four end-of-life determinations into con-
sideration together, as each end-of-life decision rightfully warrants its own
discussion as a unique category in and of itself. However, for the sake of
comparison in the whole discussion of personal autonomy by way of well-
protected constitutional rights, it is helpful to weigh the judicial decisions
and state statutes from a more horizontal perspective. As the mores of soci-
ety constantly evolve, these topics of self-initiated medical determinations
are increasingly important so long as humans continue to be bound by
mortality.
In evaluating the topic of one's right to die, a competent individual is
considered to enjoy full autonomy over his or her own life when faced with a
terminal illness while on some kind of life-sustaining treatment. The Su-
preme Court's assumption of this constitutional right in Cruzan has been
useful in establishing a type of base for various end-of-life decisions.207 Con-
versely, when dealing with the issue of medical futility, there are limits im-
posed on personal autonomy by way of "reverse right to die." In effect,
expert physicians in some states have the ability to refuse medical life-sus-
taining treatment when it is rendered to be medically futile. Regrettably, the
recognition or denial of a constitutional right is not the focus of the discus-
sion concerning the harsh reality that some families must face. Rather, medi-
cal futility represents a gap in the role of the judiciary, as courts have failed
to clarify the rights and countervailing interests involved in the decision-
making process. Thus, state legislation is necessary in resolving the
problems of medical futility, but the laws in this area are lacking as well.
In the conflict-ridden topic of physician-assisted deaths, or physician-
assisted suicides, the vast majority of states have decidedly taken a clear
stance against such methods for end-of-life decisions. Oregon remains dis-
tinct from all other states in that no other state legislature has effectively
207. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 270 (1990).
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passed anything like the Oregon Death with Dignity Act.208 For the most
part, the citizens of the forty-nine other states have not budged enough from
their moral positions regarding this topic, and even if they were to do so,
there would be several challenges from within the state and the federal gov-
ernment. The constitutional right regarding anything related to the concept
of suicide does not exist in the American legal system, and this trend does
not seem to be changing any time soon based on the lack of legislative enact-
ments in even the country's most liberal states.
And for the benefit of comparative analysis, a look into the constitu-
tional rights afforded to pregnant women to procure an abortion is valuable
in constructing a working paradigm of the distinguishing factors, which make
abortion more amenable to the mores of society than PAS. For the foresee-
able future, the abortion issue seems as though it will continue to be an im-
portant platform on which politicians run their campaigns. But regardless of
differing stances on the topic, the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade
from almost four decades ago continues to be binding precedent today,
though some may argue that the decision has become more complicated since
then. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Court found it important enough to
recognize a constitutional right of privacy, which requires careful scrutiny if
an attempt is made to compromise that right. The identification of this con-
stitutional right is unique when observed against the lack of rights provided
for pain-ridden patients searching for personal autonomy in making their re-
spective decisions based on the quality of their lives.
However, this important issue continues to gain momentum in the dis-
cussions of palliative care for terminally ill patients. Even as reasonable
minds differ on the topic, some states have activists and advocates on both
sides of the PAS issue combining efforts to support intractable pain relief
statutes, which could be seen as optimistic attempts to reach a reasonable
compromise in the interest of suffering patients.209 In supporting the creation
of intractable pain relief acts, several states are looking to provide acceptable
models or guidelines in providing aggressive pain medication.21o This may
only be a consolation to true personal autonomy, but collective efforts such
as these are necessary to translate good intentions and negative perceptions
into hope for what is supposed to be the primary focus-the patient. It is in
this very regard that all of these end-of-life decisions may be connected. Af-
208. The Oregon Death With Dignity Act, OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 127.805 (West
2005).
209. See generally Sandra H. Johnson, Disciplinary Actions and Pain Relief. Analy-
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ter all, the end goal is to avoid depriving "any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law (while providing) the equal protection
of the laws."211
211. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

